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INTRODUCTION
[N]o church property is taxed and so the infidel and the atheist and the man
without religion are taxed to make up the deficit in the public income thus
caused.1
Over a century has passed since tax exemption for religious
organizations was officially codified in the United States.2 These
organizations have enjoyed the benefits of such exemptions, having grown,
flourished, and garnered wealth and favor in society.3 In effect, the privilege
of tax exemption has enabled religious organizations to become a form of
“big business” in the American marketplace.4
Most recently, religious organizations’ 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) taxexempt status has come under heightened political scrutiny with President
Donald J. Trump’s promise to repeal the “Johnson Amendment.”5 Enacted in
1954, the “Johnson Amendment” is a piece of legislation that bars religious
organizations from receiving tax-exempt status (or altogether revokes their
existing tax-exempt status), if the religious organization attempts to
“influence legislation” or “participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”6 In his address to the
National Prayer Breakfast on February 2, 2017, the President declared that
the Johnson Amendment does not “allow our representatives of faith to speak
freely and without fear of retribution.”7 A few months later, the President
issued an executive order “Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty,”
which effectively mandated the relaxation of enforcement of the Johnson
Amendment with respect to those religious organizations that “speak[] or
ha[ve] spoken about moral or political issues from a religious perspective.”8
1

ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, MARK TWAIN’S NOTEBOOK 223 (1935).
See Ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114 (1913).
3
See Christine Roemhildt Moore, Religious Tax Exemption and the "Charitable Scrutiny"
Test, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 295 (2003).
4
Id.
5
President Donald J. Trump, Remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Feb. 2, 2017, 9:11 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/remarkspresident-trump-national-prayer-breakfast [hereinafter President Trump].
6
26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231).
7
President Trump, supra note 5.
8
President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Directive Executive Order Promoting Free Speech
and Religious Liberty, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 4, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
2
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The President made it clear that he issued the executive order for the purpose
of “direct[ing] the [Internal Revenue Service] not to unfairly target churches
and religious organizations for political speech.”9
With the President having taken executive action to ease taxable
consequences on religious organizations (and their ministers), at least with
respect to religious liberty and freedom of speech, such action seemed to
indicate that the President would only authorize those laws and taxes not
unduly burdening the finances of religious organizations. Yet, in almost a
complete about-face from the executive order, President Trump signed into
law the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”),10 which quietly imposed a new tax
on churches, as well as other nonprofits.11 This new tax required tax-exempt
organizations to begin paying a twenty-one percent tax on the fringe benefits
provided to their employees, such as parking and transportation benefits.12
Not surprisingly, the discovery of such a taxation requirement outraged
churches and nonprofits, largely a product of a Republican-led Congress,
finding it “oxymoron[ic]” and “horrendously unfair,”13 particularly in light
of the Republican-backed administration’s apparent allegiance to alleviating
the tax burden on religious organizations.
With much confusion surrounding the current administration’s
actions—and whether these actions, in totality, were promulgated to ease the
overall taxable burden on religious organizations—foundational questions as
to the constitutional legitimacy of the statutory scheme on religious taxexemption persist. Muddying the waters even further are not only the policy
constraints of First Amendment jurisprudence, but also the Internal Revenue
Service (“IRS”) and the courts, both of which have become reluctant to
engage in any inquiry as to the validity of a religious organization’s taxpresidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-promoting-free-speech-religious-liberty/
[hereinafter Presidential Directive].
9
President Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump at the Faith and Freedom
Coalition’s Road to Majority Conference, THE WHITE HOUSE (June 8, 2017, 12:30 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-faith-freedomcoalitions-road-majority-conference/.
10
Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13304, 131 Stat 2054 (2017).
11
Brian Faler, Republican Tax Law Hits Churches, POLITICO (June 26, 2018, 5:05 AM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/06/26/republican-tax-law-churches-employees670362.
12
Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13304, 131 Stat 2054 (2017).
13
Julian Gregorio, The Unintended Target of Tax Reform: Churches Now Face 21% Penalty,
WASH. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/7/taxreform-hits-churches-penalty-employee-benefits/.
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exempt status. Of course, there is merit in the maxim that “both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from
the other within its respective sphere.”14 Nevertheless, some of the Internal
Revenue Code (“Code”) provisions applicable to tax-exempt religious
organizations are constitutionally suspect, given their plausible, potential
violation of the Establishment Clause.15
Because special tax rules apply exclusively to churches, it is
important to distinguish churches, a subset of religious organizations, from
the major umbrella category of religious organizations.16 The term “church”
is not limited strictly to those houses of worship with Christian affiliations.17
Rather, the Code utilizes the term “church” to represent Christian-based
churches, temples, synagogues, mosques, or other houses of worship.
Although the Code uses the term “church,” the IRS has failed to statutorily
define the term.18 Nevertheless, the IRS generated 14 criteria that it relies
upon in determining whether an entity qualifies as a “church.”19 The 14
criteria are: (1) a distinct legal existence; (2) a recognized creed and form of
worship; (3) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; (4) a formal
code of doctrine and discipline; (5) a distinct religious history; (6) a
membership not associated with any other church or denomination; (7) an
organization of ordained ministers; (8) ordained ministers selected after
completing prescribed studies; (9) a literature of its own; (10) established
places of worship; (11) regular congregations; (12) regular religious services;
(13) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young; and (14) schools
for preparing of its ministers.20
Apprehension over the constitutionality of the pertinent tax
provisions is especially evident where religious organizations, whose
purposes are often premised on philanthropy and provide moral guidance, are
able to profit in substantial sums, or realize incredible gains, by capitalizing
14

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
As will be seen in later sections of this Article, we utilize the three-pronged Lemon test to
determine whether a statute has a secular legislative purpose, by exploring the statute’s
legislative history and Congressional intent.
16
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REV. 8-2015, 501(C)(3): TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, (Aug. 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 88 T.C. 1341, 1358
(1987).
15
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on preferential tax treatment. According to a 2010 estimate generated by the
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States, contributions
to around 330,000 churches totaled more than $34 billion.21 Moreover,
studies estimate that U.S. churches own approximately $300 to $500 billion
in property, some of which is exempt from state property taxation.22 On a
local scale, New York’s nonpartisan Independent Budget Office calculated
that New York City alone lost approximately $627 million in property tax
revenue due to the property tax exemption for churches.23
Perhaps what most seriously raises the brow of the taxpayer, however,
is the inordinate gain some religious entities receive by manipulating the
statutory scheme in their favor.24 For example, in the fiscal year from 2016
to 2017, Lakewood Church, a “megachurch” in Houston, Texas, received an
annual amount of $79 million in charitable contributions, which directly
fueled its operating budget of approximately $90 million; $25 million of that
budget was utilized for television ministry.25 In addition, the Church of
Scientology has collected annual receipts of approximately $200 million
($125 million of which is derived from spiritual counseling, known as
“auditing”) in addition to enjoying property values totaling $1.5 billion.26

21

John Montague, The Law and Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the
Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 203, 206 (2013) (citing Nat'l Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Yearbook of American & Canadian Churches 386 (2012)).
22
Please note that the fifty (50) states and the District of Columbia afford churches, as well
as other nonprofit organizations, exemption from state property taxation. See Jeff
Schweitzer, The Church of America, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2011, 3:49 PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jeff-schweitzer/robert-jeffress-romney_b_1002753.html.
23
David Seifman, New York City’s Losing $13.5 in Property-Tax Breaks, N.Y. POST (July
16, 2011, 4:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2011/07/16/new-york-citys-losing-13-5b-inproperty-tax-breaks/.
24
The Code maintains a prohibition against “inure[ment] to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual” connected to a tax-exempt organization. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3)
(West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). Charities, including religious organizations,
may be penalized for transacting or excess benefits in which an economic benefit conferred
upon an insider exceeds the value of consideration. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4958(c)(1)(A)-(B) (West,
Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231). Excessive economic benefit is determined by an
evaluation of “reasonable compensation,” which is defined as the “amount that would
ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises… under like circumstances.” 26 C.F.R.
§ 53.4958-4(b)(ii) (West, Westlaw current through Nov. 2, 2018).
25
See Katherine Blunt, How Does Lakewood Church Spend Its Millions? Here’s A Look at
the Budget, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 31, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/
investigations/article/How-does-Lakewood-Church-spend-its-millions-We-12955372.php.
26
Christopher Matthews, How Much Does Scientology Pocket from Its Tax Exempt Status?,
FORTUNE (Apr. 8, 2015, 8:35 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/04/08/scientology-tax-exempt/.
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Even more alarming is the luxury some ministers of the gospel realize
through exploitation of the tax-exempt statutory scheme. In 2007, U.S.
Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) launched an investigation27 into the financial
status of several leaders of six large churches, requesting each leader to
voluntarily disclose information.28 Reports from local news articles and tips
from charity-watchdog groups drove the investigation, claiming that these
targeted ministers were participating in lavish expenditures, including the
purchase and enjoyment of private jets, Rolls Royce cars, vacations in Hawaii
and Fiji, multi-million dollar homes, and in one case, $23,000 marble-topped
commodes.29 To the Iowa Senator’s dismay, these investigations yielded
minimal responses, if any at all, from the targeted ministries.30 Meanwhile,
other pastors such as Kenneth Copeland, a pastor of a megachurch in Texas,
have continued to exploit the favorable taxation scheme, enjoying a $6.3
million estate, complete with tennis courts, a large boathouse, and garages on
either side of the 18,000-square-foot mansion.31
Recognizing the
advantageous taxation benefits religious
organizations enjoy, coupled with the potential for abuse and exploitation of
the tax-exempt statutory scheme at the hands of religious organizations and
their leaders, this Article proposes a three-fold solution: (1) the
harmonization of the statutory framework, in connection with other nonreligious tax-exempt organizations; (2) the requirement of application for taxexempt recognition and annual tax filings, supplemented with an empowered
27

Senator Grassley elaborated upon the purpose of the investigation, stating the following:
“Historically, Americans have given generously to religious organizations, and those who
do so should be assured that their donations are being used for the tax-exempt purposes of
the organizations. Recent articles and news reports regarding the possible misuse of
donations made to religious organizations have caused some concern for the Finance
Committee.” See Letter to Pastor Benedictus Hinn, World Healing Center Church, Inc.,
CHUCK GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FOR IOWA (Nov. 5, 2007), available at
https://www.grassley.senate.gov/sites/default/files/about/upload/prg110607b.pdf.
28
Press Release, Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-based Ministries, CHUCK
GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FOR IOWA (Nov. 6, 2007), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/
Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=12011.
29
Kathy Lohr, Senator Probes Megachurches’ Finances, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(Dec. 4, 2007, 7:57 PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16860611
[hereinafter Lohr].
30
See Neela Banerejee, Senator Awaiting Records of Ministries’ Finances, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
24, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/24/us/24church.html.
31
John Burnett, Onscreen But Out of Sight, TV Preachers Avoid Tax Scrutiny, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 2, 2014, 4:03 PM), https://www.npr.org/2014/04/02/298373994/
onscreen-but-out-of-sight-tv-preachers-avoid-tax-scrutiny.
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auditing power in the IRS; and (3) IRS enforcement of the Johnson
Amendment’s prohibition against certain forms of “political activity.” Part I
of this Article provides a brief history of religious tax exemption, from the
biblical era to early American colonial society and subsequent development
of the modern statutory scheme. Part II discusses the constitutionality of taxexemption of religious organizations, focusing on Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause implications. Part III begins by exploring the favorable
tax treatment religious organizations receive, and the concern for abuse of the
statutory scheme due to lax enforcement protocol. Part III finishes by
asserting the aforementioned three-fold proposal, and the relative ease by
which this three-pronged approach could be actualized.
I.

A HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION

To more fully comprehend the statutory framework surrounding tax
exemption for churches and religious entities in the United States tax system,
it is first necessary to explore the historical underpinnings of religious tax
exemptions. Yet, even while the discussion of historical backdrop is typically
a relatively straightforward task in a number of fields, in the context of
religious tax exemptions, there is no precise moment in which religious
organizations achieved state-authorized tax-exempt status.32 Scholar Dean
M. Kelley writes:
No one can find that point in history where some great
lawgiver declared, “Come now, and let us exempt the church
from taxation, for behold! it is as part of the fabric of the state
and a pillar of the throne.” There is no time before which
churches were taxed and in which we can seek the reason for
exemption.33
Although the gamut of historical evidence shows that tax exemptions for
religious entities may have existed in ancient civilizations, such as the
Sumerians,34 this Article narrows its historical lens primarily on taxation with
Judeo-Christian origins.
32

Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American Churches Failed
to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 32 (2004)
[hereinafter James].
33
See Dean M. Kelley, Why Churches Should Not Pay Taxes 5 (New York, Harper & Row
1977).
34
John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 522 (1991-1992) [hereinafter Whitehead].
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From the Book of Genesis to the Decree of Constantine

In the Judeo-Christian context, scholars largely point to the story of
Joseph in ancient Egypt as the first instance of religious tax exemption.35
Joseph, who was the son of Jacob, a Hebrew living in Canaan, was sold by
ten of his brothers into slavery in Egypt, only to eventually become the
Pharaoh’s trusted servant.36 Given this position of stature, the Pharaoh tasked
Joseph with ensuring that the people of Egypt were adequately fed during a
crushing seven-year famine.37 As part of this task, Joseph executed the
following actions: he acquired all Egyptian land, with the exception of the
land of the priests, and he implemented a law in which the Pharaoh had a
right to claim one-fifth of all produce generated on Egyptian land, except
produce grown on the land of the priests.38
Many years later, and well after Moses led the Exodus of the Israelites
out of Egypt on a journey to the “promised land” of Canaan, the Hebrews
formed a kingdom, ruled by David and Solomon, both of whom levied
substantial taxes on the Hebrews.39 David, the predecessor to Solomon,
implemented the tax to finance the Hebrew nation’s war machine; in contrast,
Solomon, enforced a tax to build the Temple.40 Yet, while the Hebrews
suffered a major economic burden as a direct result of this taxation, the priests
remained unscathed by these excessive taxes.41 This was only further
legitimized by scriptural reinforcement that religious figures were to be tax
exempt, as revealed in the Book of Ezra: “[w]e [are] also [to] inform you that
it is not permitted to impose taxes, tributes, or tolls on any priest, Levite,
singer, gatekeeper, temple slave or any other servant of that house of God.”42
It was not until the dawn of the age of Jesus Christ that the
philosophical advocacy for the separation of church and state, at least
regarding taxation, became manifest.43 In response to a question of whether
Jews should pay taxes to the Roman dictator Caesar, Jesus stated, “[r]ender
35

James, supra note 32, at 32-33.
See Genesis 41:37-46.
37
Id. at 54-56.
38
See Genesis 47:22, 24, 26.
39
James, supra note 32, at 32-33.
40
See II Samuel 1:1; I Kings 11:43.
41
See Martin A. Larson & C. Stanley Lowell, The Churches: Their Riches, Revenues, and
Immunities, 15 (Washington, R.B. Luce 1969) [hereinafter Larson & Lowell].
42
Ezra 7:24 (emphasis added).
43
See Matthew 22:15-22.
36
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therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things
that are God’s.”44 Later, following the death of Christ and subsequent acts of
his apostles, the disciple Paul reinforced Christ’s words when addressing the
Romans: “For because of this you also pay taxes, for the authorities are
ministers of God, attending to this very thing. Pay to all what is owed to them:
taxes to whom taxes are owed, revenue to whom revenue is owed, respect to
whom respect is owed, honor to whom honor is owed.”45
While Jesus Christ seemingly advocated the position that everyone
was to pay imperial taxes unto Caesar, the leaders of the new age of imperial
Christendom said otherwise. Under the Edict of Toleration in 313 C.E., the
Roman Emperor Constantine formally deemed Christianity a religion of
equal standing in the eyes of the Roman Empire.46 Following his decree,
Constantine converted to Christianity, and in an effort to establish
Christianity as the new, official religion of the Roman Empire, Constantine
granted several advantages to the Christian Church, such as a total exemption
from all forms of taxation, among other benefits.47 Despite the fact that
subsequent emperors scaled back such advantageous tax benefits, many of
the tax exemptions remained embedded within Roman society.48
Of course, the widespread rippling effect of Christianity, born from
the Roman Empire, naturally reached England, among others sovereignties,49
influencing its taxation policy through the Middle Ages.50 While rulers such
as England’s King Henry II levied taxes with exemptions for religious

44

Id. at 21.
See Romans 13:6-7 (ESV).
46
James, supra note 32, at 35 (“[P]lacing Christianity on equal footing with cult of Isis and
other pagans religions within the Roman Empire”).
47
Other benefits included the following: generous fees from the public treasury; immunity
from military service; and the provision that Catholic [Christians] alone be eligible to hold
political office. Moreover, the Church was empowered to receive gifts and legacies; and the
wealth of all who died intestate or without direct heirs was automatically conferred upon it.
See Larson & Lowell, supra note 41, at 19.
48
James, supra note 32, at 38 (citing Alfred Balk, The Free List: Property Without Taxes 21
(1971)).
49
See Whitehead, supra note 34, at 530 (citing W. Durant, Our Oriental Heritage 374, 812
(1954)).
50
James, supra note 32, at 37.
45
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figures,51 others “outright repealed the ecclesiastical preference.”52 King
Henry VIII’s decision to siphon wealth from the Catholic Church in the
sixteenth century, upon severing ties with papacy amid the Protest
Reformation,53 coupled with Oliver Cromwell’s rigid levying of taxes on
church property a century later,54 visibly illustrated the deviation from statesponsored religious tax-exemption. This was largely because the growing
British Empire needed a great deal of financial support to fund its imperial
expansion.55
This trend was to change with the advent of the American colonies.
Although the British throne exhibited the “very real threat to a [religious
organization’s] existence whe[re] the ability to tax is wielded by a sovereign
bent on destruction . . . of the institution,”56 the post-Revolutionary-War
American experiment sought to recommit the “mutual independence of
religious and political sovereignties.”57
B.

From Early American Society to the Modern Statutory Scheme

Despite the fact tax exemption for religious institutions has pervaded
numerous sovereignties, British common and equity law have had the most
readily discernible effect on tax exemptions for churches in the United States.
Under British common law, church property located within the parameters of
the jurisdiction of the Crown (and its colonial annexations) was exempted
from ecclesiastical laws.58 To secure tax exemption under British common
law, the church seeking exemption from the property taxation was required
to fulfill three conditions.

51

In 1188, King Henry I levied a tax to support the Crusades. While such an ordinance taxed
all other persons, property and sources of revenue, it entirely exempted the “books and
apparatus of clergymen” from the ordinance. See Claude W. Stimson, Exemption of Property
from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 416 (1934).
52
Cody S. Barnett, Bringing in the Sheaves: Combating Televangelists’ Abuse of the Internal
Revenue Code, 105 KY. L.J. 365, 371 (2017) [hereinafter Barnett].
53
See J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VII 241-338 (1968).
54
See Whitehead, supra note 34, at 530.
55
Barnett, supra note 52.
56
Erika Lietzan, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971,
975 (1999).
57
Id. at 975 (citing Leo Pfeffer, Church, State & Freedom 16-17 (1953)).
58
J. Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. REV. 363, 368 (1991) [hereinafter Witte, Jr.].
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First, the exemption was granted only to state-established church
property that was used for religious purposes.59 Dissenting churches were
ineligible for the exemption.60 Second, the exemption was only from “the
ecclesiastical taxes that were levied for the church's own maintenance and
use.”61 The church was required to pay other taxes, such as quit-rents and
hearth and window taxes.62 Third, the tax exemption could be eliminated “in
times of emergency or abandoned altogether if the tax liability imposed on
remaining properties in the community proved too onerous.”63
However, because many settlers of the pre-Revolutionary New World
desired freedom from religious persecution at the hands of various European
governments (principally, England), religious tax treatment varied from
colony to colony, often dependent upon those religious sects occupying each
colony.64 On the lenient end of the spectrum, more tolerant colonies, such as
Georgia and Maryland,65 allowed taxpayers a choice in determining which
religious organizations could receive contributions from the taxpayercolonist.66 On the stringent end of the spectrum, some colonies, such as
Massachusetts, mandated the supply of tax assistance only to churches
recognized by the particular colony.67 In addition, Virginia instituted
governmental measures, providing support for the clergy, at the expense of
farmers who were required to pay tithes to the clergymen.68
Even after the Revolutionary War and subsequent ratification of the
Constitution in 1788–followed shortly thereafter by the adoption of the First
Amendment in 1791–religious tax exemption did not cease.69 In fact, the
practice of religious tax exemption continued, despite the absence of the
following: (1) a legal basis for granting such exemptions, such as the British
59

Id. at 370.
Id. at 371.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 371-72.
63
Id. at 372.
64
See James, supra note 32, at 38-39; see also Barnett, supra note 52.
65
These states allowed such an election from a “general tax assessment.” See James, supra
note 32, at 38.
66
Barnett, supra note 52.
67
Massachusetts exempted those individuals who supported the colony-sponsored Church,
while enforcing a tax against those who supported the non-sponsored Congregational
Church. See James, supra note 32, at 38-39.
68
James, supra note 32, at 39 (citing D.B. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? 47
(1968)).
69
See Whitehead, supra note 34, at 545.
60
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common law’s mandatory satisfaction of qualifying conditions;70 (2) explicit
language in the Federal Constitution; and (3) explicit language in the newly
adopted state constitutions.71 Despite the absence of state or federal
constitutional mandates, state governments began enacting statutes officially
recognizing religious tax exemptions.72 On the federal level, some early tax
statutes contained sections requiring the exemption of federal tax from
charitable organizations, including churches.73
After the passage of these early statutes by the federal and state
governments, Congress explicitly provided for the tax exemption of
charitable organizations, including religious institutions such as churches,
through its enactment of the first federal income tax, imposed during the Civil
War.74 Approximately 30 years after the passage of this first federal income
tax, Congress enacted a more comprehensive tax scheme, the Tariff Act of
1894, which again provided an explicit exemption from tax for “associations
organized and conducted solely for . . . religious . . . purposes.”75 Despite the
Supreme Court’s declaration that the Tariff Act of 1894 was unconstitutional
because its imposition of federal income taxation did not apportion in
accordance with representation (and for reasons wholly unrelated to the tax
exemption on religious organizations),76 the terms of the tax exemptions
recurred in the Payne Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909,77 and again in the Revenue
Act of 1913.78

70

See Witte, Jr., supra note 58, at 372-74; see also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 682
(1970).
71
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Congress eventually made federal income taxation constitutional with
the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment,79 followed by the Revenue Act of
1913.80 Although the Revenue Act has undergone a myriad of substantive
revisions since its enactment, language surrounding the religious tax
exemption has survived each iteration. In the modern statutory scheme, 26
U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) provides tax exemption for groups “organized and
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition.”81 Even more fascinating is the fact that
“churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of
churches” receive automatic tax-exempt status; in other words, churches82 do
not need to file a Form 1023 to receive tax-exempt status, 83 nor are they
required to file annual Form 990s to report on their financial conditions.84
However, before analyzing the mechanics of the statute regarding tax
exemption, and the numerous privileges that accompany the statutory
provisions, the constitutionality and related jurisprudence surrounding
religious tax exemption will be explored in the following Part.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS TAX EXEMPTION

The IRS, governmental agencies, and federal and state courts have
either refused to define or have been extremely cautious in attempting to
define “religious” activities or the word “religion.”85 By extension, such
governmental entities have been reticent to engage in probing inquiries over
tax exemption for religious entities. This is, of course, attributed to the
existence of the First Amendment, which provides, in part, that “Congress
79
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
80
See Ch. 16, § II(G), 38 Stat. 114,(1913).
81
26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 115-231) (emphasis added).
82
Nevertheless, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) indicates that the parent category of
“religious organization” must file a Form 990 with the IRS.
83
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84
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(last updated May 11, 2018).
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shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof.”86 The component clauses, the “establishment of
religion” and “prohibiting the free exercise” are known as the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, respectively. According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, these clauses are designed to function as a textual
commitment to the notion of separation between church and state. In other
words, these clauses “rest upon the premise that both religion and government
can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere.”87 Nevertheless, these two clauses (hereinafter
the “Religion Clauses”) have caused the courts to “struggle[] to find a neutral
course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute
terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to
clash with the other.”88
Part II proceeds as follows: Section A briefly discusses the
applicability of the Free Exercise Clause in relation to religious tax
exemption; Section B analyzes the avoidance of church-state entanglement,
as tethered in the Establishment Clause; and lastly, Section C maps the
constitutional jurisprudence of religious tax exemption, by tracking the
evolution of judicial thought as it relates to the charitable nature and purpose
of religious tax exemption.
A.

Free Exercise Clause

The Free Exercise clause is implicated when there is a conflict
between secular laws and the religious beliefs of an individual. Not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court has provided a more thorough expansion on
this very tension: the “government may neither compel affirmation of a
repugnant belief, nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups
because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities.”89 To ensure
that the government does no such thing, the Court requires that a state “be
neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers”90
and “confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede
religious activity.”91
86

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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88
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Historically, religious entities such as churches have argued that the
revocation of tax exemption would violate the Free Exercise Clause.92
Because “an unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to
destroy,”93 churches worry that “a more onerous tax rate . . . might effectively
choke off an adherent’s religious practices,”94 destroying free religious
exercise. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected this position, stating that
“not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional.”95 More specifically, the
burden of taxation, “to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax
merely decreases” the funds available for “religious activities, any such
burden is not constitutionally significant.”96 In sum, the Supreme Court held
that so long as a generally applicable tax does not burden the individual’s
practice of his or her religion, the government could theoretically levy a tax
on the church, as there is no violation of the Free Exercise Clause.97
Notwithstanding the conclusion that the Free Exercise Clause is not
implicated by taxation on a religious entity, a law may still fail to pass FirstAmendment muster due to a violation of the Establishment Clause.
B.

Establishment Clause

The Establishment Clause is more applicable to the law of tax
exemption for religious entities, given that the taxation necessarily requires
an element of the “regulation of religious organizations and institutions.”98
The Supreme Court has declared that the Establishment Clause’s purpose, by
design, is to avoid “sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity,”99 to steer clear from the entanglement of
church and state. In determining whether government action complies with
the principle of neutrality, the Supreme Court established the tripartite Lemon
test (aptly named after the Court decision). In this test, a statute adversely
affecting religious entities is only constitutional where the following three
92
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criteria are met: (1) it must have a “secular legislative purpose;” (2) its
“principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion;” and (3) it must not foster an “extensive government entanglement
with religion.”100
In the context of taxation, there is special concern that governmental
“inspection and evaluation” of religious organizations, such as an audit of
church records, membership, and financial matters, “is fraught with the sort
of entanglement that the Constitution forbids.”101 By enacting a wholesale
tax exemption on religious entities, there is certainly some form of
preferential treatment of religion. Strangely, the favorable treatment of
religious entities seems, at first blush, to directly violate separation of church
and state and the very dangers the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.102
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in elaborating upon this irony, stated that “[b]oth tax
exemptions and tax deductibility are a form of subsidy that is administered
through the tax system [and] [a] tax exemption has much the same effect as
a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on
its income.”103 Nevertheless, time and time again, the Court has stated that
the standard for determining the constitutionality of a benefit to a religious
organization is not that of preference; but rather, that of neutrality.104
C.

Tax Exemption & Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Giving rise to question over the constitutionality of tax exemption for
religious organization, within the framework of the Establishment Clause,
was the landmark case of Walz v. Tax Commission of New York. In Walz, a
New York property owner sued the New York Tax Commission, which
formally granted tax-exempt status for the property of religious
organizations.105 The Court, upholding the tax, wrote that the “State has an
affirmative policy that considers [religious entities] as beneficial and
stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful,
desirable, and in the public interest.”106 The Court, nevertheless, recognized
100
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102
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Ct. 1436, 1450 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing Madisonian origins of the
Establishment Clause)).
103
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
104
See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris et al., 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
105
Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970).
106
Id. at 673.
101

72

CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

that the granting of such tax exemptions “necessarily operates to afford an
indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser,
involvement than taxing them.”107 Because the government, in granting such
a tax exemption, does not directly “transfer part of its revenues to churches
but [rather] simply abstains from demanding that the church support the
state,” the Court held that there “is no genuine nexus between tax exemption
and establishment of religion.”108 More specifically, the tax exemption
“creates only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state
and far less than taxation of churches.”109 This tangential involvement,
according to the Court, ultimately “restricts the fiscal relationship between
church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce the desired
separation insulating each from the other.”110
Interestingly, however, was the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
“social welfare” test regarding religious tax exemption. The Supreme Court
reasoned that such a “yardstick” approach for charitable contribution “could
conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to constitutional
dimensions.”111 If the Court were to employ a test that would require it to
engage in a searching inquiry of the religious organization’s activities to
determine whether they qualify as sufficient charitable contribution, the
Court could effectively “tip the balance toward governmental control of
churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”112 Justice Brennan,
in his concurring opinion, differed significantly from the majority, insisting
on the utilization of the “social welfare” test.113 According to Justice
Brennan, religious organizations “are exempted because they, among a range
of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the
community in a variety of nonreligious ways,” and as such, these religious
organizations “bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by
general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community.”114 In
addition, Justice Brennan asserted that the “government grants exemptions to
religious organizations because they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of
107
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American society by their religious activities.”115 Despite such a deviation
from conventional jurisprudence on the prevention of church-state
entanglement, Justice Brennan’s “social welfare” theory foreshadowed the
change in paradigm with how the Supreme Court would view religious tax
exemption.116
In Bob Jones University v. United States, thirteen years after the
decision in Walz, the Court borrowed from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in
Walz when the Court upheld the IRS’s revocation of a Christian-based
university’s tax-exempt status due to its acts of discrimination on the basis of
race.117 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, declared that
“entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common law
standards of charity . . . that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must
serve a public purpose . . . .”118 In other words, the Supreme Court based its
revocation of the religious organization’s tax-exempt status based on a public
policy rationale, as opposed to First Amendment constitutionality.119 Indeed,
this new rationale indicated that it was plausible for a religiously tax-exempt
organization to lose its status as tax-exempt if the organization effectively
failed to provide a charitable purpose in line with 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).120
Taking it a step further, the Court commented, in footnote 20 of the decision,
that “contemporary standards must be considered in determining whether
given activities provide a public benefit and are entitled to charitable tax
exemption.”121 In essence, the Court opened the door to permissible legal
inquiry as to whether the IRS could pursue religious organizations on the
basis of “charitable purpose” or “public policy” under 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3).122
After entertaining a discussion on the public-policy rationale of the
tax-exemption, the Supreme Court returned to form, wrestling again with the
constitutionality of the benefits that religious entities receive as a result of tax
exemption.123 In Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
115
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Supreme Court, having employed the tripartite Lemon test,124 concluded that
a “statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the Establishment
Clause merely because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets
of some or all religions.’”125 Rather, tax exemptions do not advocate for,
endorse, or support religion in general or “[any] particular religious
practice.”126 Being of neutral design and purpose, the Supreme Court made
fairly clear that regulations which do “not facially differentiate among
religious sects, but appl[y] to all religious entities,” as well as secular
organizations, pass “constitutional muster.”127
In summary, the holdings of Walz, Bob Jones University, and
Hernandez provided a jurisprudential guide for how courts will analyze
future challenges to the constitutional legitimacy of tax-exemption for
religious organizations, especially in juxtaposition with its secular
counterparts in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
D.

The Internal Revenue Code & Religious Tax Exemption

The Code contains numerous provisions addressing the special tax
treatment religious organizations receive by the mere fact that they have a
self-declared religious purpose. Groups “organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals . . . .”
are exempted under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).128
Section D proceeds in two parts: Subsection i identifies and analyzes
the constitutionality of the tax provisions which provide preferential tax
treatment for religious organizations over other charitable organizations; and
Subsection ii outlines the potential for abuse of the tax-exemption scheme
and how a religious organization may have its tax-exempt status revoked or
invalidated.
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The Perks of Being Religious, and Its (Sometimes)
Questionable Nature

There are 14 provisions of the Code granting preferential tax
treatment that benefit churches and other religious organizations or practices,
some of which are constitutionally suspect.129 To begin, the IRS requires
almost all other charitable organizations to file a Form 1023 Application for
Recognition of Exemption, under 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3) of the Code.130
Churches, as well as their associations, integrated auxiliaries, and
conventions, however, are statutorily excused from such a filing
requirement.131 Legislative history regarding such an exemption is silent as
to the reason for this filing exception.132 Generally, a fairly thorough and
complex application for recognition of tax exemption must be submitted to
the IRS, usually leading to further requests for additional documentation from
IRS agents, and often lasting over a series of months.133 It is clear, however,
that the purpose of this statutory carve-out is to draw a “line of separation”
between government and religion134 in a way that “minimize[s] entanglement
in the exemption process.”135 Moreover, the IRS requires most tax-exempt
organizations to file Form 990 forms, which are annual information returns
or notices.136 Churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or
associations, are exempted from the filing of a Form 990.137 Similar to the
background on the lack of an initial filing requirement, there is no legislative
history that justifies this exemption either.138 Furthermore, the Code requires
tax-exempt entities to report to the IRS when undergoing dissolution,
liquidation, termination, or substantial contraction.139 But, again, exempt
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from this requirement are churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions
and associations (and other small public charities).140
In the statutory realm of charitable organizations, the Code
distinguishes those organizations classified as a “public charity” from those
classified as a “private foundation.” Possessing status as a “public charity” is
more advantageous from a tax perspective; churches, their conventions, and
associations, receive automatic designation as a “public charity.”141 Once
again, the legislative history accompanying the enactment of “public charity”
is silent, other than Congress noting “that [it] believed that certain types of
‘institutional’ charitable entities should be regarded as public charities
because of their nature and activities.”142 It is important to note, however, that
other types of organizations including schools, hospitals, medical research
organizations, and government bodies receive similar treatment under
“public charity” status.143
Although the Code provisions favoring religious tax-exemption
appear to be arbitrary, they are plausibly rooted in anti-church-state
entanglement grounds, at least on the basis that there is no intermeddling by
the federal government with the fiscal nature of the religious organization, to
keep both spheres “insulat[ed] [] from the other.”144 Nevertheless, not all
Code exemptions for religious organizations are rooted in the principle of the
Establishment Clause. Of the 14 Code provisions related to religious tax
exemption, the provision that raises arguably the most serious questions of
constitutional validity is the “parsonage rental allowance” accorded to
ministers of the gospel.145 This rental allowance effectively permits a minister
of the gospel to exclude from gross income the rental value of a home
furnished as part of compensation146 and rental allowances.147 The
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constitutionality of the parsonage rental allowance was first considered in
2002 by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Warren v. Commissioner,148
in light of Pastor Rick Warren’s housing allowances of $76,000 to $80,000
each year, an amount equal to or just shy of his church salary.149 But before
the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to rule on its constitutionality, Congress
intervened by enacting legislation, titled the Clergy Housing Allowance
Clarification Act of 2002,150 which provided a statutory rule on the “fair
rental value” of the rental allowance paid to the ministers of the gospel as part
of their compensation.151
Despite Congress’s intervention, the parsonage rental allowance was
again challenged in Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Lew, where
a Wisconsin federal district court held that the “parsonage rental allowance”
was unconstitutional because it results in the preferential treatment for
religious messages, a blatant violation of the Establishment Clause.152 The
court added that the government failed to “identify any reason why a
requirement on ministers to pay taxes on a housing allowance is more
burdensome for them than for the many millions of others who must pay taxes
on income used for housing expenses,”153 and additionally found that such a
law “discriminates against those religions that do not have ministers.”154
Despite the court finding that all three prongs of the Lemon test were violated,
the decision was ultimately vacated on appeal when the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit stated that the plaintiffs lacked a “constitutionally
cognizable injury.”155 Years later, in a new case, the same federal district
court ruled that the “parsonage rental allowance” violates the Establishment
Clause, primarily because it has no secular purpose or effect, as required by
the first prong in Lemon.156 This time, however, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit issued a substantive decision.
148
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Circuit Judge Brennan, writing for the majority, ultimately found no
violation of the Lemon test, declaring that the parsonage rental allowance
“falls into the play between the joints of the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause: neither commanded by the former, nor proscribed by
the latter.”157 Taking it a step further, the Court employed the “historical
significance test,”158 and deferred to the government, intervening parties, and
amici curiae’s offer of “substantial evidence of a lengthy tradition of tax
exemptions for religion, particularly for church-owned properties.”159 In
effect, by excluding parsonages from income, and excluding cash allowances,
Congress was merely continuing its “’historical practice[]’ of exempting
certain church resources from taxation.”160 Although the plaintiff of the case
was “weighing whether to ask the full 7th Circuit to review the case or take
it to the U.S. Supreme Court,”161 no petition for certiorari was filed, leaving
more ambiguity whether this issue will appear before the Supreme Court
again.
Other Code provisions that raise Establishment Clause issues include
rules about “charitable gift substantiation” and “quid pro quo contributions.”
Most intriguing about the rules surrounding charitable gift substantiations, in
connection with religious organizations, is that the Supreme Court addressed
its constitutional validity five years before the enactment of this section. The
Supreme Court explored the “inherently reciprocal nature” of charitable
exchanges with a religious organization.162 Evaluating the payments given to
the Church of Scientology in exchange for auditing sessions (designed to
augment spiritual actualization), the Court found that, in the context of a
charitable contribution, only those “unrequited payments” may be
deductible.163 Here, however, the Court found that the exchange of a donative
gift contribution for goods or services (i.e., the auditing sessions) was the
very embodiment of a quid pro exchange.164 Despite holding that such
payments to religious organizations should not be given special preference,
157
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Congress codified an exemption for compliance with gift substantiation and
quid pro quo exchanges. Consequently, many “charitable exchanges” will
likely fly under the statutory and constitutional radar.
Additional provisions appear to flag constitutional concern and
controversy with secular purpose. Code rules, centered on commercial-type
insurance, preclude tax exemption for tax-exempt charitable organizations
when the organizations’ primary activity is to issue commercial-type
insurance, or in the alternative, treat such insurance activity as an unrelated
business.165 Of the five exceptions to the definition of “commercial-type
insurance,” one pertains to casualty or property insurance provided by a
church, or a convention or association of churches.166 The other pertains to
the award of retirement and/or welfare benefits by a church, or a convention
or association of churches, for the employees of the same, or for the
beneficiaries of the employee.167 Thus, in applying the first prong of the
Lemon test, it is clear there is no obvious secular rationale for a carve-out for
churches and associations or conventions of churches. As a result, other
charitable organizations that provide the same benefits and insurance as
churches and associations or conventions of churches are at risk for (1) denial
or revocation of tax exemption, or (2) unrelated business income taxation.168
Perhaps the most blatantly constitutionally suspect provision relates
to the Code’s rules regarding neighborhood land. As a general statutory
matter, a tax-exempt organization is taxed for income derived from debtfinanced property, and such income recorded as unrelated business income
for tax purposes.169 The Code recognizes an exemption for interim income
derived from debt-financed neighborhood real property and received by a taxexempt organization.170 To meet this exemption, the tax-exempt organization
must devote the property to one or more exempt uses within ten years of
acquiring the property, and have the property situated in the organization’s
neighborhood.171 Churches, however, receive a five-year increase in the
permissible time to put the property to one or more exempt uses, and are not
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obligated to have the property situated in the church’s neighborhood.172
Although the legislative history is silent about this special rule,173 the Code
openly signals a violation of the second prong of Lemon by titling this special
rule as the “Special rule for churches.”174 Armed with no secular rationale
and facial impropriety of government advancement of religion, this carve-out
for tax-exempt churches raises red flags about its constitutionality.
As discussed above, tax-exempt religious entities enjoy a wide spread
of privileges that are unavailable to secular-based charitable organizations,
even those which provide more tangible economic benefits to the U.S.
infrastructure. How then should the constitutional legitimacy of statutes
which either provide legislatively inexplicable benefits or violate the prongs
of the Lemon test be addressed? The IRS is empowered and has authority to
examine tax-exempt organizations; but as we will see, special rules impose
restrictions on tax examinations concerning religious entities, such as
churches.175 Despite this, there are other means by which the IRS could more
effectively regulate religious organizations’ potential exploitations of the
Code.
2.

Caution Over the Abuse of Tax Exemption

Given the remarkable benefits and tax advantage religious
organizations enjoy, even over fellow tax-exempt charitable organizations,
the Code opens the possibility for religious organizations to exploit the
modern taxation framework. At the very minimum, a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
group must satisfy a tax-exempt purpose and neither (1) “inure[] to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual” “[a] part of the [organization’s] net
earnings,” nor (2) “attempt[] to influence legislation . . . or intervene in . . .
any political campaign on behalf of… any candidate for public office.176
Thus, the Code explicitly forbids tax-exempt religious organizations from
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operating as (1) commercial enterprises for private gain,177 or (2) vehicles for
lobbying or political activities.178
Despite these clear prohibitions, the IRS’s ability to investigate is
clearly hampered due to the difficulty of policing new religions (and their
accompanying practices),179 and restrictions on church taxation inquiries and
examinations.180 Novel churches, such as “electronic churches” and “mailorder ministries,” frustrate the IRS because the IRS must walk a delicate
balance between legally acceptable probing into potential tax fraud or
sheltering and recognizing constitutional protections for nontraditional,
minority, or unorthodox religious groups.181 Amid the “tightrope act,” abuse
cases remain prevalent, with “tax avoidance clearly taking precedence over
religion.”182 Recognizing the reality that “taxpayers who establish churches
solely for tax avoidance purposes” was “reaching a breaking point,”183 the
Tax Court declared that “taxpayers [who] use the pretext of a church to avoid
paying their share of taxes” and who “resort to the courts in a[n] [] attempt to
vindicate themselves” will have sanctions imposed upon them for undue
delay,184 and will be penalized for evasion of taxes legally due.185
Almost a year after the Tax Court’s warning to potential abusers, The
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 went into effect, including special rules
(known as the “Church Audit Procedures Act”) that imposed restrictions on
the IRS in its investigations of churches.186 Not surprisingly, the legislative
history of these rules is silent on the reason for this enactment.187 On its face,
177
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like the other Code provisions granting advantages to religious tax
exemptions, this restriction appears to violate the first two prongs of the
Lemon test: (1) it does not have a secular legislative purpose, and (2) its
primary effect is the advancement of religion.188 The statute provides that a
church tax inquiry can only be commenced “if an appropriate high-level
Treasury official reasonably believes . . . that the church (A) may not be
exempt, by reason of its status as a church . . . or (B) may be carrying on an
unrelated trade or business . . . .”189 The purpose of the Church Audit
Procedures Act is to “assist both the church under examination and the
Internal Revenue Service in a tax audit and resolve clearly defined issues
quickly in consonance with [the] Constitution.”190 The Act possesses
additional features other than the “reasonable belief” basis: restrictions on
examinations,191 notice requirements,192 limitations on period of inquiries
and examinations,193 and pre-examination conferences between the targeted
churches and the IRS.194
But just as the IRS received statutory ammunition to investigate and
explore potential abusers of the modern statutory scheme, the IRS also failed
to define the “high-level Treasury official,”195 effectively rendering the
Church Audit Procedures Act hamstrung. Even as the IRS attempted to vest
auditing power in the Director of Exempt Organizations Examinations
(“DEOE”),196 a church successfully argued that the DEOE did not meet
would “resolve clearly defined issues quickly in consonance with [the] Constitution. See 130
CONG. REC. 9,152 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Grassley); see also Religious
Organizations, supra note 129, at 23, (citing H. Rep't No. 98-861, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1984) (Conference Report)).
188
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189
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190
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congressional intent in naming a “high-level Treasury official.”197 The court,
in opining over the qualifications of the DEOE, declared that because the
DEOE was an examining authority, the DEOE was “at odds with the
legislative purpose of vesting the authority to halt over-zealous examination
of churches in a high-level Treasury official.”198 Following this decision, the
IRS retreated, abstaining from defining the appropriate official to satisfy the
“high-level Treasury” position,199 leading to an ultimate cessation in the
conducting of church audits.200 As a result, questions again lingered
concerning how the IRS was to investigate prospective abusers of the taxation
scheme.
E.

The Johnson Amendment

The Johnson Amendment, as codified in 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3),
provides that a tax-exempt entity must limits its charitable activities so that:
[N]o substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation
(except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for
public office.201
In other words, the Code imposes two obligations on tax-exempt religious
organizations: (1) propaganda, or other undefined attempts to influence
legislation, may not comprise a “substantial part” of the religious
organization’s activities; and (2) churches may not participate in, or intervene
in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition) to any candidate
who is seeking a position in the public office.
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In contravention to these impositions by the Code, the President’s
issuance of the executive order “Promoting Free Speech and Religious
Liberty” called for the IRS to abandon enforcement of the Johnson
Amendment against those religious organizations not playing within the
bounds of the Code’s political prohibitions.202 This Article calls not only for
the abandonment of the executive order, thereby permitting the IRS to resume
enforcement of the Johnson Amendment, but also for the enforcement to be
stringently advanced, so that tax-exempt religious organizations are obligated
to rigidly adhere to the Code’s restrictions. But before providing suggestions
for how the IRS could effectively crack down on those religious
organizations that are abusing technical work-arounds, it is first useful to
address often-invoked challenges to, and criticisms of, the Johnson
Amendment and its prohibition on certain forms of political activity.
Before drawing upon the sound, constitutional justifications as to why
the Johnson Amendment passes muster, it is first necessary to clarify what
exactly the Johnson Amendment outright prohibits, and what it has always
permitted. Prior to the issuance of the executive order, the President, in his
remarks at the National Prayer Breakfast, declared that the repeal of the
Johnson Amendment is critical to the “freedom [of] the right to worship
according to our own beliefs.”203 Its removal from the Code would encourage
and allow “our representatives of faith to speak freely and without fear of
retribution.”204 Yet, while such a declaration is certainly laudable in its
promotion of First Amendment protections, the President ultimately missed
the mark. The Johnson Amendment does not punish those members, or even
church leaders (e.g., pastors, ministers, etc.), who speak in an individual
capacity regarding political issues that are in direct conflict with, or in support
of, the moral obligations of their religion. Rather, the Johnson Amendment
punishes speech offered by those individuals speaking as emissaries of the
religious organization. More simply, it is not speech from religiously
affiliated individuals that is punished (as this speech is highly protected under
First Amendment protections), it is speaking from the pulpit, designed and
intended to promote political ideas or to support candidates for public office,
on behalf of the religious organization.
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Former president John F. Kennedy articulated this fine distinction on
the importance of religious liberty and freedom of speech in his historic
address to the leaders of the Southern Baptist Church.205 In the context of
anti-Catholic sentiment and fear that the presidential candidate would
unquestionably follow direct orders from the Vatican, Kennedy delivered an
impassioned speech before the Greater Houston Ministerial Association.206
In the address, John F. Kennedy envisioned a separation of church and state,
and disentanglement between politicians and church leaders:
I believe in an America where the separation of church and
state is absolute -- where no Catholic prelate would tell the
President (should he be a Catholic) how to act and no
Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for whom to
vote -- where no church or church school is granted any public
funds or political preference -- and where no man is denied
public office merely because his religion differs from the
President who might appoint him or the people who might
elect him. . . . I believe in an America that is officially neither
Catholic, Protestant nor Jewish -- where no public official
either requests or accepts instructions on public policy from
the Pope, the National Council of Churches or any other
ecclesiastical source -- where no religious body seeks to
impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general populace
or the public acts of its officials -- and where religious liberty
is so indivisible that an act against one church is treated as an
act against all.207
Ultimately, John F. Kennedy imagined not the silence of religiously driven
speech, but a necessary barrier between formal religious speech as it relates
to political activity, and vice versa.
Perhaps the foremost raised contention against the constitutionality of
the Johnson Amendment is that it infringes on a religious organization’s (and
its ministers’) First Amendment right to the free exercise of its religion.
While there is a restriction on religious entities and their freedom to express
205
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overtly political views or advocate for a candidate for public office, this
provision passes constitutional muster. Under Employment Division v. Smith,
the Supreme Court held that the right of free exercise “does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”208 Here, the Johnson
Amendment is neutral both on its face and on its application: it governs nonreligious 501(c)(3) organizations that have tax-exempt status.209 To exclude
religious organizations from this requirement would be the functional
equivalent of awarding preferential treatment to religious organizations.210
Thus, while the Johnson Amendment does not address the fact that some
religious organizations and ministers may feel compelled by their religious
beliefs to engage in political discussion, the Johnson Amendment is
constitutional, given its application is neutral, secular, and generally
applicable to all 501(c)(3) organizations.
Second to criticism under Free-Exercise principles are challenges
under the First Amendment right of free speech. Time and time again,
however, plaintiffs have challenged the Johnson Amendment but failed to
demonstrate that the Johnson Amendment violates the First Amendment right
of free speech. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, the
Supreme Court upheld the denial of 501(c)(3) status to a religious
organization, stating that the “Congress is not required by the First
Amendment to subsidize lobbying.”211 Elaborating upon the legal
justification for the Code’s prohibition of certain political activity, the Tenth
Circuit, in Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,
provided:
In light of the fact that tax exemption is a privilege, a matter
of grace rather than right, we hold that the limitations
contained in Section 501(c)(3) withholding exemption from
nonprofit corporations do not deprive [the religious
organization] of its constitutionally guaranteed right of free
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speech. The taxpayer may engage in all such activities without
restraint, subject, however, to withholding of the exemption
or, in the alternative, the taxpayer may refrain from such
activities and obtain the privilege of exemption.212
Thus, the courts have made clear that the government has absolutely no
obligation to provide tax exemptions for tax-exempt organizations that
engage in forbidden political activity.213 Tax-exemption is a form of
congressional grace,214 rather than a constitutional right: what Congress
“giveth,” it may “taketh” away.
These challenges and criticisms of the Johnson Amendment overlook
the genuine, compelling purpose of the Johnson Amendment. If Congress
were to repeal the Johnson Amendment, 501(c)(3) organizations, including
religious organizations, could receive tax deductions for donations to
religious organizations.215 What is the significance of this result? Donors
could deduct any contributions on their federal income tax return, creating
incentives for donors to donate to tax-exempt organizations, as opposed to
Political Action Committees (“PACs”) or super-PACs.216
Moreover, even when PACs and super-PACs are required to identify
their donors, donors of 501(c)(3) organizations, including religious entities,
are not required to disclose their donors’ identities.217 In Citizens United vs.
Federal Election Commission, Justice Kennedy expounded upon the dangers
of donor-driven political action:
When private interests are seen to exert outsized control over
officeholders solely on account of the money spent on (or
withheld from) their campaigns, the result can depart so
thoroughly “from what is pure or correct” … that it amounts
to a “subversion ... of the ... electoral process.”218
212
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Depriving Congress of the capacity to regulate the electioneering
process yields the “‘cynical assumption that large donors [who] call the tune
could jeopardize the willingness of voters to take part in democratic
governance.’”219 While the First Amendment does indeed protect the sanctity
of political speech, transparency through donor disclosure “enables the
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different
speakers and messages.”220 Armed with the tax deduction, the donor of the
religious organization would be shielded from having to disclose its
donations; consequently, the absence of donor transparency could signal the
death toll for an effective democracy: “cynicism and disenchantment.”221
Assuming the absence of the Johnson Amendment, religious
organizations, whose tax-exempt status presupposes the offering of
community philanthropy and moral guidance, could pocket sizable
contributions from donors, all in the name of supporting a political cause,
ideology, or candidate for office. This absence could breed grounds for
generating tax shelters and donor transparency, thereby welcoming the
potential for improperly arranged religious organizations. Thus, the Johnson
Amendment serves a more compelling interest than merely prohibiting
entanglement between religious ideology and political activity: it “ensures
that citizens of all faith traditions (or no faith tradition) are not inadvertently
financially supporting church-based politicking,” and further guarantees
“that the government [is] not entangled in underwriting partisan political
activity”222 under the guise of religious liberty.
III.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSTITUTIONAL AMBIGUITIES AND CHURCH ABUSE

Given the numerous privileges that tax-exempt religious
organizations enjoy over complementary charitable organizations, it is no
wonder why some founders of such religious organizations have exploited
the modern statutory framework surrounding 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).223
Eradication of such abuse, however, does not call for the complete revocation
219
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of tax exemption for religious organizations. As discussed earlier, religious
organizations provide intangible benefits that “uniquely contribute” to the
diverse American tapestry.224 Also, as the Supreme Court has recognized,
there is at least some constitutional justification, vis-à-vis the Establishment
Clause, for identifying a nexus between tax exemption and the functions of
religious organizations.225 This Article argues for a middle-of-the-road
position, one which respects the societal purpose of tax exemption for
religious organizations, but which also brings the requirements for religious
organizations more in line with the obligations of non-religious charitable
organizations. The proposal is three-fold: (1) harmonize the statutory
framework in conformity with other tax-exempt, charitable organizations; (2)
require initial tax filings and Form 990s, supplemented with an empowered
“Church Audit Procedures Act”; and (3) mandate the IRS to enforce the
Johnson Amendment’s prohibition on specified political activity
A.

Harmony Among Charitable Organizations

Religious organizations experience clearly measurable tax
advantages, even over other 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations.226 We are
left to accept these advantages as rooted in acknowledgement and respect for
the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause. But
even where some of the statutory exemptions for religious organizations may
be explained by First Amendment jurisprudence (i.e., exemption for initial
filing), such a philosophy does not explain, or even rationalize, why other
exemptions, such as the exemption for income derived from debt-financed
neighborhood property, exist. Yet, similarly situated charitable organizations
experience no such exemptions.227 As demonstrated in Section II, these taxexemption provisions are likely unconstitutional as applied strictly with
respect to religious organizations, due to the violation of the tripartite Lemon
test.
This Article argues that statutory provisions exempting religious
organizations from standard charitable obligations (or giving them more
statutory grace) should be re-written to align with the exemptions available
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to all charitable organizations. To start, such a solution is clearly
constitutional,228 because there is an obvious secular legislative purpose for
requiring equal treatment between secular charitable organizations and
religious organizations. Moreover, equal treatment among organizations
clearly does not promote or inhibit the exercise of religion; rather, equal
treatment permits the religious organizations to operate on grounds of
taxation and financing, rooted in neutrality. With no special statutory
treatment to religious organizations, no further inquiry is required as to
whether there is a Lemon violation, harmonizing the taxation regime for
religious organizations with the rest of the regime on charitable
organizations. Second, the court system has already demonstrated that a
number of these provisions, such as the parsonage rental allowance, are
constitutionally or entirely suspect.229 What is to stop prospective litigants
from challenging the constitutional validity of these tax advantages;
consequently, what is to stop the courts from striking down the remaining
provisions as unconstitutional Lemon violations? The answer is nothing. All
that remains is proper standing to challenge these provisions.
Therefore, to remove any suspicion as to government-sponsored
advancement of religion, the IRS should align the following provisions of the
Code with other charitable organizations: initial tax recognition and
assessment;230 annual information returns and notices;231 report of
dissolution, liquidation, or substantial contracting;232 parsonage rental
allowance;233 charitable gift substantiation rules;234 quid pro quo contribution
requirements;235 commercial insurance exception;236 commercial insurance
benefits exception;237 the debt-financed neighborhood land rule;238 and
limitations to IRS on examination of religious organizations.239 Of course,
this is merely the first step in the progression toward statutory harmony. The
228
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following subsection addresses arguably the most important component of
the harmonization: the demand for initial filing for exempt status and
subsequent annual filings, coupled with effective utilization of the Church
Audit Procedures Act.
B.

Tax-Exemption Filings & IRS Examinations

Recalling the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in the Walz
decision: religious organizations “are exempted because they, among a range
of other private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the
community in a variety of nonreligious ways,” and as such, these religious
organizations “bear burdens that would otherwise either have to be met by
general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the community.”240
And again, in Bob Jones University the Court, echoing the concurrence of
Brennan, declared that “entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting
certain common law standards of charity . . . that an institution seeking taxexempt status must serve a public purpose . . . .”241
To ensure that religious organizations meet these “common-law
standards of charity” and avoid behavior that does not serve a public purpose,
a more thorough review by the IRS is imperative. First, Congress should
revise the Code to require religious organizations to file a Form 1023, which
excuses churches, integrated auxiliaries of churches, and conventions and
associations.242 Second, Congress should additionally revise the Code to
require religious organizations to file annual information returns (i.e., Form
990) or submit notices to the IRS. At first glance, it appears the imposition of
filings upon religious organizations would violate Establishment Clause
principles, because the IRS would necessarily intermeddle with the nature of
religious organizations. While there is some validity to this claim, the purpose
of the initial filing with the IRS is to “give[] notice to the Secretary” of its
application for recognition as a 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).243 It is not to review
the practices and belief systems of the religious organization seeking an
exemption.
The requirement for filing a Form 990 is no different in its noninvasive nature. The Form 990 sets forth the following items pertinent to the
240
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financial actions of the organization: gross income, receipts, disbursements,
gifts and contributions received from various sources, and “other information
for the purpose of carrying out the internal revenue laws.”244 Thus, the
statutory scheme surrounding the Form 990 never requires an annual review
of the religious organization’s practices. Instead, it only requires a review of
its financial operations. To support this position, the Supreme Court has noted
that “routine regulatory interaction which involves no inquiries into religious
doctrine, no delegation of state power to a religious body, and no ‘detailed
monitoring and close administrative contact’ between secular and religious
bodies, does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command.”245 In fact,
some scholars argue the current exemption of the Form 990 requirement
entangles the government more with religion.246 The Code excuses the Form
990 requirement for a major subset of religious organizations: churches, an
interchurch organization of local units of a church, a convention or
association, an integrated auxiliary of a church, and some church-affiliated
organizations and mission societies.247 As a result, the IRS is often required
to employ a fourteen-point test to determine what constitutes a church, which
then demands a thorough inquiry of a church’s religious beliefs.248 With the
employment of the fourteen-point test to determine whether the organization
qualifies as a church, both courts and religious organizations have
demonstrated discomfort with the likelihood that the courts will render
inconsistent determination.249
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Of course, the obligation of initial filings and Form 990s amounts to
nothing, unless the IRS is statutorily authorized to conduct an investigation
under the Church Audit Procedures Act (“CAPA”). Recall that the CAPA
authorizes a “high-level Treasury official” to initiate an audit or investigation
against an organization classified as a church by the IRS.250 Before
conducting such an audit, the “high-level Treasury official” must have a
“reasonable belief” that the church is either (1) not actually a church as
defined in the IRS regulations, or (2) engages in otherwise taxable activity.251
But while the Act does appear to empower the IRS to conduct a more
comprehensive inquiry, the “high-level Treasury official” remains undefined,
with Congress and the IRS abstaining from taking actions to designate an
individual or associated IRS position to fulfill the role.252 The solution,
though demanding considerable Congressional action, is straightforward:
Congress and/or the IRS must select an appropriate “high-level Treasury
official.” While the statute does contemplate the selection of a secretary of
the Treasury,253 it is fair to state that audits of churches (and other churchrelated organizations) are a fairly low priority. Some scholars argue the
Director of Exempt Organizations (“DEO”), an official merely one rank
above the DEOE, should be selected. Like the DEOE, this too received
disapproval.254 Alternatively, other scholars have taken the approach most
closely resembling Occam’s razor, “[a]mend[ing] the [Act] [to] [n]ame the
[IRS] Commissioner [or his designee] as a sufficient ‘High-Level Treasury
Official.’”255 This position has been endorsed by multiple organizations,
including the American Center for Law and Justice.256
In sum, the IRS, empowered with the capacity to demand Form 1023s
and subsequent filings of Form 990s, could easily review and audit the
financial workings of religious organizations—specifically churches—to
ensure that they are serving a proper public purpose. Moreover, the IRS, as
advocated by scholars, should name an appropriate individual to the position
of “high-level Treasury official” to give teeth to the Church Audit Procedures
Act. These demands, which facially appear to require more state
250
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involvement, would merely require the IRS and federal government to
perform a review of the financial data of the organizations to ensure that no
abuse or non-charitable activity is alive within the religious organization.
C.

Strict Enforcement of the Johnson Amendment

For all the fierce opposition to the Johnson Amendment, the irony is
the law has never been stringently enforced against those churches violating
the prohibitions of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). In fact, there exists only one court
decision in which a church lost its tax-exempt status as a result of violating
the statutory ban on specified political activity.257 Remarkably, there is
evidence suggesting that religious organizations violate these prohibitions
more egregiously than the IRS’s history of enforcement may suggest. In
2004, the IRS commenced a project titled the “Political Activity Compliance
Initiative” (the “Initiative”), the purpose of which was to “promote
compliance” with the 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) prohibition “against political
campaign intervention by reviewing and addressing allegation of political
intervention (PI) by tax exempt organizations on an expedited basis during
the 2004 election year.”258 Of the 132 cases assigned to the IRS for further
examination, 40 involved churches.259 Further, of the 40 churches targeted,
37 churches were found to have improperly committed acts of political
convention, to which the IRS issued written advisories or assessed excise
taxes.260 Thus, given the statistical figures of this study, and the vast number
of churches in the United States, a large number of churches likely engage in
some form of politics that may cross the threshold of improper politicking.261
But the IRS is lax—at best—in its enforcement of the Johnson
Amendment. Of course, there are consequences to such unpredictability and
restraint. For one, lax enforcement by the IRS encourages, or even enables,
churches, associations, conventions, and integrated auxiliaries of the
churches to feel more empowered to violate the Johnson Amendment, due to
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the low number of IRS investigations of churches.262 In addition, the IRS’s
minimal enforcement of the political ban provides little guidance to those
religious organizations seeking to discern what compliance and noncompliance may actually amount to, through a prosecutorial lens.
Even more agonizing is the fact that the IRS has yet to issue clear
guidance as to exactly what constitutes forbidden political activity. Turning
directly to the statute, one can readily see that 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) fails to
define: (1) what amounts to a “substantial part” of a religious organization in
attempting to influence legislation, and (2) what constitutes “participati[on]”
or “interven[tion]”in a political campaign, on behalf of (or in opposition to)
any candidate for public office.263 Not surprisingly, the companion
regulations to the Code are equally worthless, stating the obvious extent of
the statute: “the publication or distribution of written or printed statements or
the making of oral statements on behalf of or in opposition to such a
candidate” are forbidden.264
In yet another attempt to clarify the reach of the Johnson
Amendment’s prohibition on specified political activity, the IRS published
Revenue Ruling 2007-41, which provides 21 examples illustrating the
application of the facts and circumstances to be considered to determine
whether an organization exempt from income tax under section 501(c)(3) has
engaged in any forbidden political activity.265 But just as one expects the IRS
to provide clear lines of demarcation with this newly promulgated Revenue
Ruling, it warns the reader that an organization’s activities must be measured
by “all the facts and circumstances” present in the factual situation.266 Equally
less helpful is the fact that each of the factual situations listed “involves only
one type of activity,” with further analysis needed when there is a
“combin[ation] [of] one or more types of activity.”267 But more disheartening
than the frailty of ideally constructed factual situations is that the Revenue
Ruling does not teach the practitioner any more than previously known. In
fact, the IRS fully acknowledged that religious organizations may engage in
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political activity, so long as this activity is performed in a neutral fashion, as
embodied in the following actions:
[1] Invite all candidates for political office to address their
congregation, provided there is a statement that says the views
expressed are those of the candidates and that the church is not
endorsing any candidate. . . . [2] Distribute a list of voting
records of all members of Congress on major legislative issues
involving a wide range of subjects, provided the publication
contains no editorial opinion and its content and structure do
not imply approval or disapproval of any members or their
voting records. . . . [3] Sponsor a voter registration drive,
provided it is done so in a neutral manner and is nonpartisan.268
Although intended to act as more helpful guidance to religious organizations,
the Revenue Ruling ultimately falls short of its aim, teaching no more than is
already known, and failing to give meaningful enforceability of the Johnson
Amendment.
As such, enforceability of the political prohibitions requires more than
mere advisory opinions; enforceability demands congressional resolution of
ambiguity and actual enforcement by the IRS against those religious
organizations in direct violation of the statute. Professor Vaughn E. James
proposes a twofold approach to more efficient enforcement of 26 U.S.C. §
501(c)(3): (1) erasure of the ambiguity of the term “substantial part,” and (2)
clearly defining what exactly constitutes participation or intervention in a
political campaign.269 This Article both recommends and departs from
Professor James’s twofold solution to ensure stringent enforcement of the
Johnson Amendment.270
First, amending the Code to clarify the definition of what constitutes
a “substantial part” would not only provide notice to religious organizations
curious about the extent of their influence in legislation, but would also
provide the IRS with a bright line of the activity to specifically target.
Professor James writes that the language “substantial part” should be
268
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narrowly limited to “direct or indirect contact with an elected official in
attempt to influence legislation.”271 Although the proposal invites a myriad
of speculative inquiries as to what constitutes an “indirect contact” with an
elected official, what is certain is that the proposal captures those situations
in which direct contact is made by the religious organization, on behalf of the
religious organization, with the elected official, to influence legislation.
While the IRS has historically struggled with effectively prosecuting those
religious organizations that violate the Johnson Amendment’s prohibition,
this retooling of the definition would empower the IRS to more consistently
and equitably proceed with enforcement. As an added plus, the proposed
change provides ample notice to religious organizations about whether their
activities amount to lobbying. Professor James’s proposal does not prevent
members of religious organizations from contacting legislators, driven by
their religious convictions; rather, it prevents the tax-exempt religious
organization from doing such.
Second, Professor James calls for a clear definition as to what exactly
constitutes participation or intervention in a political campaign, which is
critical to the success of strict enforcement. While there is validity in this
request, to provide additional guidance to the IRS (and notice to religious
organizations), additional regulations and revenue rulings will not likely aid
the IRS in enforcing the Johnson Amendment. Rather, the following actions
must occur. First, the President’s executive order, titled “Promoting Free
Speech and Religious Liberty,” must be overturned, either though revocation
by the current sitting (or later-elected) President, or legislation geared to
invalidate the executive order. Second, following the revocation, the IRS
must begin to explore and investigate the taxation status of a church under
the (hopefully) revitalized CAPA. It is through this mechanism the IRS could
execute an examination of the organization’s non-religious records and
activities to determine whether the organization has engaged in improper
political activity.
In sum, to further prevent exploitation of the taxation scheme under
26 U.S.C.§ 501(c)(3), Congress must provide a brighter line with what
amounts to a “substantial part” of a tax-exempt organization’s activities in
connection to lobbying. Moreover, the IRS must commence proper
enforcement of the Johnson Amendment and investigate those religious
271
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organizations either in violation of the Code’s prohibitions, or close to being
in violation, to issue advisory warnings or punish with excise taxes.
CONCLUSION
As related in this Article, there are a number of Code provisions
which demand greater scrutiny through Establishment Clause analysis. Time
and time again, however, because of constraints by policy and First
Amendment jurisprudence, the IRS and the courts have exercised restraint in
entertaining discussion as to the constitutional validity of these provisions,
and with that, the legitimacy of some religious organizations’ tax-exempt
status.
Further complicating the affairs of IRS policy and First Amendment
jurisprudence is the interplay between the executive and legislative branches.
Presently, it remains contestable whether the administration ultimately
wishes the overall tax burden on religious organizations to decrease. But,
with seemingly incongruent policies authorized by the Trump administration,
it remains a prominent question of whether the executive orders and
administration-backed legislation support, in totality, the legitimacy of the
statutory scheme on religious tax-exemption.
But while the government continues to avoid these pressing issues,
many religious entities and leaders are empowered to exploit the malleable
statutory framework for their financial benefit. Of course, the Constitution
protects churchgoers, pastors, and believers who wish to personally provide
tangible and intangible benefit to the unique American fabric; but surely the
Constitution and Code do not provide insulation for those institutional
“wolves” who come in “sheep’s clothing.”

